Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Fifth Amendment Right to Grand Jury by Lewis, Tracey McCants
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 37 Number 2 Article 12 
1999 
Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Fifth Amendment 
Right to Grand Jury 
Tracey McCants Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tracey M. Lewis, Constitutional Law - Procedural Due Process - Fifth Amendment Right to Grand Jury, 37 
Duq. L. Rev. 407 (1999). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol37/iss2/12 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-FIFtH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO GRAND JURY-The United States Supreme Court held that a Cauca-
sian criminal defendant has standing to raise Equal Protection and Due Process
claims based upon the racially discriminatory exclusion of non-Caucasians from
serving as his or her grand jury foreperson.
Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998).
On January 11, 1992, after an evening out with friends, Susan
Campbell accepted a ride home from Dr. James Sharp. Unbeknownst to
either of them, Terry Campbell, Susan's estranged husband, had followed
them.' As James Sharp sat in his van, Terry Campbell shot him through
the window.' James Sharp later died as a result of his injuries.3 Terry
Campbell was arrested and charged with second degree murder under
section 14:30.1 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.4
Campbell was subsequently indicted by a Louisiana state grand jury
for second degree murder.5 Before trial, Campbell filed a motion to quash
the grand jury indictment, alleging that the grand jury foreperson selec-
1. State v. Campbell, 673 So. 2d 1061,1063 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
2. Id. Terry Campbell shot Dr. James Sharp at approximately 2:30 a.m. on January 11,
1992. Three People Indicted by Grand jury, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Feb. 6, 1992, at 3B.
The fatal shot struck Dr. Sharp in the heart, resulting in his loss of control of his van. Id.
3. Campbell, 673 So. 2d at 1064. After being pulled from his van by the Pine Prairie Vol-
unteer Fire Department, Dr. Sharp was taken to Savoy Medical Center, where he was pro-
nounced dead on arrival. Acandiana Parishes Acandiana Bureau, THE BATON ROUGE MORNING
ADOV., Jan. 14, 1992, at 2B. Terry Campbell was arrested on the afternoon of January 11,
1992, at Cypress Hospital in Lafayette, Louisiana. Id. Cypress Hospital specializes in the treat-
ment of mental diseases and drug abuse recovery. Id.
4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West 1997). The statute provides in relevant part as
follows:
§ 30.1 Second degree murder A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human
being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bod-
ily harm; or (2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggra-
vated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree robbery, even though he
has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. B. Whoever commits the
crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard
labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Id.
5. Campbell, 673 So. 2d at 1064. An indictment is a prosecutorial accusation of a crime
that is issued by a grand jury against the party charged with the crime. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 772 (6th ed. 1990). "An indictment is merely a charge that must be proved at trial
beyond a reasonable doubt before defendant may be convicted." Id.
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tion process used by Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, discriminated against
African-Americans.6 The trial judge overruled his motion to quash the
grand jury indictment, noting that, "there is no racial discrimination in
the process used in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana against the Defendant
Campbell."7 Specifically, the trial judge found that Campbell lacked the
necessary standing to assert violations under the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause on the basis of racial discrimination in the
grand jury foreperson selection process The judge found that Campbell
was not denied equal protection of the law and, therefore, had no stand-
ing to raise the issue of discrimination against African-Americans in the
grand jury foreperson selection process.' Campbell was sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
suspension of sentence."
Campbell appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeals, asserting that
the trial court erred in denying both the motion to quash the grand jury
indictment and the motion for a new trial." The court of appeals found
that Campbell had standing to claim discrimination against African-
Americans in the grand jury selection process in Evangeline Parish.
12
6. State v. Campbell, 661 So. 2d 1321,1322 (La. 1995) rev'd and remanded, State v. Camp-
bell, 651 So.2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
7. State v. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412, 412 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
8. Campbell, 651 So. 2d at 412. To establish standing, a plaintiff must meet the following
requirements:
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . .and (b) ac-
tual[;] (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of and the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant, and not ...th[e] result [ofn the independent
action of some third party not before the court and (3) it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by favorable
decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
9. State v. Campbell, 661 So.2d at 1322. The judge reasoned that, because Campbell was a
white man accused of murdering another white man, he suffered no real injury as a result of a
grand jury selection process that had historically resulted in the selection of Caucasian foreper-
sons. Id.
10. Campbell, 651 So. 2d at 1412. Many jurisdictions have sentencing guidelines that pro-
vide the sentencing judge with a specific sentence or sentence range for a particular crime. 24
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1479 (1989). The purposes of such guidelines, which can be mandatory,
as in this case, are to provide a system of uniformity and equity, give guidance to the sentencing
court, and promote judicial review. Id.
11. Brief for Respondent at 5, Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998) (No. 96-1584).
12. Campbell, 661 So. 2d at 1332. The court analyzed the claimant's rights as a criminal
defendant under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The court of appeals found that Campbell
was also entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether statistical data could support
his claim of underrepresentation of African-Americans in the grand jury foreperson position.
James M. McGoldrick, Equality and Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: Can a White Defendant
Campbell v. Louisiana
The prosecution appealed the decision of the court of appeals to the
Louisiana Supreme Court on the grounds that Campbell lacked standing
to bring his equal protection and due process claims.13 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the court of appeals and held that Campbell,
as a Caucasian defendant, did not have standing (1) to bring an equal
protection claim regarding the racial discrimination in the grand jury
foreperson selection process because he was not of the same race as were
the people who were systematically excluded from foreperson selection;
(2) to bring a due process claim challenging discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans in the selection of grand jury forepersons because the role
was "ministerial"; or (3) to raise an equal protection claim for African-
Americans who were not chosen to serve as grand jury forepersons be-
cause of their race. 4
Campbell filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court alleging that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision directly con-
flicts with relevant Supreme Court decisions addressing the same issues of
standing. 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to ad-
dress a single issue: whether a Caucasian criminal defendant has standing
to raise equal protection and due process objections on the basis of dis-
crimination against African-Americans in the selection of grand jury
forepersons. 16
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court found
that Campbell did have the requisite standing to assert equal protection
and due process objections." The Court relied on Powers v. Ohio"8 to
establish Campbell's right to challenge the racially discriminatory selec-
tion of his grand jury." Although Powers involved the exclusion of pro-
spective African-American jurors through the use of peremptory strikes
Challenge the Exclusion of Nonwhites from Senring as Grand Jury Forepersons?, 4 PREVIEW OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, Dec. 30, 1997, at 237, 238.
To make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman,
the defendant must show a disproportion over a significant period of time between the percent-
age of an identifiable minority in the general venire or grand jury venire and the percentage of
minority forepersons during that time and must show that the selection process is susceptible of
abuse. Campbell, 651 So. 2d 412, 413 citing State v. Young, 569 So. 2d 570 (La. Ct. App. 1990),
writ denied, 575 So. 2d 386 (La. 1991).
13. Brief for Respondent at 7, Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998) (No. 96-1584).
14. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998) (No. 96-1584).
15. Id.
16.. Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1998). Certiorari is a writ granted by a
higher court, i.e., the United States Supreme Court, as a discretionary tool in choosing the'line
of cases for review. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421.
18. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
19. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1422.
1999
Duquesne Law Review
at the petit jury2' level, the Court concluded that the reasoning of Powers
applied.2 In Powers, the Court determined that a Caucasian defendant
suffers a definite injury when his or her jury is composed using discrimi-
natory means because such discrimination not only hinders the defen-
dant's chance for a fair trial, but also undermines the integrity of the judi-
cial system as a whole. 22
In applying these rules of third-party standing, the Court determined
that Campbell proved that he suffered an identifiable injury, established a
close relationship with the excluded African-Americans through his at-
tempts of eradicating discrimination from the grand jury selection proc-
ess, and provided evidence that the excluded grand jurors would not
have likely asserted their own rights through litigation given the eco-
nomic disincentives for doing so.
23
In addressing Campbell's due process rights, the Court relied on its
decision in Peters v. Kiff to determine whether a third-party defendant
has standing.25 In particular, the Peters plurality concluded that a crimi-
nal defendant, regardless of race, "has standing to challenge the system
used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily ex-
cludes from service the members of any race, and thereby denies [the
defendant] due process of law."26
The Court also relied on Hobby v. United States,27 in which it deter-
mined the remedy available based on the assumption that the defendant
had standing to assert a due process claim in response to the discrimina-
20. There is a united system between the functions of the grand jury, before which one is
accused, and the petit jury, before which the accused is tried. GEORGE J. EDWARDS, THE
GRAND JURY: AN ESSAY 21 (1973). 'The ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action;
so called to distinguish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423.
22. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 411 (1991).
23. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424. With regard to the second requirement, the Court found
that Campbell did not attempt to establish a relationship with or assert the rights of jurors who
had been excluded over the many years; rather Campbell, attempted to show a pattern of dis-
crimination. Id. at 1424. "To assert the rights of those venirepersons who were excluded from
serving on the grand jury in his case, Campbell must prove their exclusion was on account of
intentional discrimination." Id. at 1424.
24. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). In this plurality opinion, the Court did not present a definite rem-
edy for the violation of a defendant's due process rights as a result of the discriminatory exclu-
sion of a group from the defendant's grand jury. In Peters, a Caucasian defendant challenged the
discriminatory exclusion of African-Americans from jury service. Peters, 407 U.S. at 496. Spe-
cifically, the defendant alleged that African-Americans had been "systematically excluded" from
the grand and petit juries involved in his case. Id. at 497.
25. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424.
26. Id. at 504.
27. Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
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tory selection of a federal grand jury foreperson.' In Hobby, the Court
found that the Caucasian criminal defendant had not suffered a violation
of his due process rights as a result of the discriminatory selection of a
grand jury foreperson.
The Court distinguished Hobby from its decision in the case of Rose
v. Mitchel. 29 In Rose, the Court concluded that an African-American
criminal defendant had a valid equal protection claim based on the ra-
cially-biased selection of his state grand jury foreperson.3° The Court ex-
plained that the different treatment of these cases was predicated, not on
the race of the criminal defendant, but on the selection process and pro-
cedural duties of the grand jury forepersons and the impact that such a
selection regime has on the grand jury as a whole.3 In Rose, the Court
found that the selection process the state of Tennessee used to select
grand jury forepersons called for the foreperson to be appointed by a
judge (a process that was separate from the randomly selected pool of
potential jurors.)32 In addition, the Court found that, in Tennessee state
court, the foreperson played an essential role in the overall grand jury
process. The Court emphasized the influential role of the grand jury fore-
person and the foreperson's potential affect on the outcome of a defen-
dant's hearing.33 In contrast, in Hobby, the Court concluded that, be-
cause the federal grand jury foreperson engages in "ministerial" duties,
28. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1424.
29. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 342.
30. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). In this Tennessee case, four African-American men were indicted
by a state grand jury for murder. Rose, 443 U.S. at 547. Prior to trial, the defendants filed a
written pro se motion to suspend or postpone their prosecution. Id. at 548. A motion for pro se
is a motion brought on one's own behalf or when an individual represents himself or herself in
court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). The defendants sought further relief
through dismissal of the state grand jury indictment on the basis of racially discriminatory selec-
tion process used to choose the grand jury foreperson. Rose, 443 U.S. at 548.
31. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425.
32. Rose, 443 U.S. at 548, n.2. Under Tennessee law, "[the foreperson] who shall be the
thirteenth member of each grand jury organized during his [or her] term of office, having equal
power and authority in all matters coming before the grand jury with the other members
thereof." Id.
33. Id. Citing the Tennessee Code Annotated, the Court stated as follows:
[Tiwelve members of the grand jury must concur in order to return an indict-
ment .... The [foreperson] may be one of the twelve .. . . [The foreperson] is
charged with the duty of assisting the district attorney in investigating crime,
may order the issuance of subpoenas for witnesses before the grand jury, may
administer oaths to grand jury witnesses, must endorse every bill returned by the
grand jury and must present any indictment to the court in the presence of the
grand jury .... The absence of the [foreperson's] endorsement makes an indict-
ment "fatally defective."
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"there was no infringe [ment] ... of fundamental fairness."3 4
The Campbell Court found that the Louisiana Supreme Court's ap-
plication of Hobby to preclude Campbell from asserting his due process
challenge to the discriminatory selection of his grand jury foreperson was
erroneous.35 In holding that Campbell did not have standing to assert a
due process claim, the Louisiana Court found that like Hobby, Campbell
dealt with the "ministerial" duties of the state grand jury foreperson,
which did not amount to a serious violation of the defendant's due proc-
ess rights. 36 The Supreme Court found that Louisiana's interpretation of
Hobby failed to take into consideration the long-standing rule that a
criminal defendant has standing to assert a due process claim for any
violation of his or her right to a fundamentally fair trial, including the
discriminatory selection of a grand jury foreperson." The Court distin-
guished Campbell's claim from the claim asserted in Hobby because the
Campbell's entire grand jury was corrupted by the discriminatory ap-
pointment or selection of the foreperson, who, under Louisiana law, is a
voting member of the grand jury.38 In Hobby, the Court noted "[slo long
as the grand jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the
appointment of one of its members as foreman will distort the overall
composition of the array or otherwise taint the operation of the judicial
,, 39
process.
Furthermore, the Court found that any person, regardless of skin
color, could be injured by a racially-discriminatory grand jury selection
process.' The Court noted that "the grand jury, like the petit jury, acts as
a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its
prosecutors.""'
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the major-
34. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court cited a 1984 Supreme Court decision, Hobby v.
United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. In Hobby, the Court ruled against the defendant because "the ministerial role of a
federal grand jury foreperson is not such a vital one that discrimination in the appointment of an
individual to that post significantly invades due process." 118 S. Ct. at 1425.
38. Id. In Louisiana, the judge selects the foreperson from the pool of potential grand jurors
before the remaining members of the grand jury are chosen through the system. Id. at 1422.
39. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 348.
40. Id. at 1423. The Court cited to Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,556 (1979). In Rose, the
Court reasoned that, because the grand jury is central to the criminal justice process, all neces-
sary steps must be taken to ensure that the grand jury process as part of the court system is pro-
tected and guarded for the benefit of the community as a whole. Rose, 443 U.S. at 556.
41. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1423. The court cited Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411(1991)
in making its decision.
Vol. 37:407
1999 Campbell v. Louisiana
ity's reliance on Powers v. Ohio42 to grant a Caucasian defendant third-
party standing to raise a claim of discrimination against African-
Americans.43 The dissent reasons that Powers should be overruled be-
cause it establishes incorrect and excessively liberal requirements to es-
tablish third-party standing on the part of a criminal defendant to raise
the discriminatory selection of prospective jurors." Justice Thomas noted
that, even if Powers establishes the correct elements, Campbell is distin-
guishable because Powers involved the use of peremptory strikes rather
than overt discrimination to exclude jurors and involved a petit jury
rather than a grand jury.45 Furthermore, the dissent concludes that
Campbell, like Powers, fails to satisfy the requirements for establishing
third-party standing.' Justices Thomas and Scalia opine that Campbell
failed to prove an "injury in fact;" i.e., a close relationship between him-
self and those persons excluded from potentially serving as the grand jury
foreperson; and a flaw within the judicial system preventing those per-
sons who were excluded from asserting their rights.47
The Court has historically dealt with the attempted eradication of
discrimination by use of the Fourteenth Amendment." In the 1879 case
of Strauder v. West Virginia,49 the Court first addressed the question of
whether the grand or petit jury selection process may exclude African-
42. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
43. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1426.
44. Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1427. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1427-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. Justice Scalia addressed Campbell's failure to met the requirements of third party
standing, noting,
I fail to see how a 'close relationship' would have developed between the peti-
tioner and veniremen . . . [elven if a 'bond' . . . could develop between veni-
remen and defendants during voir dire, such a bond could not develop in the
context of a judge's selection of a grand jury foreman-a context in which the
defendant plays no role . Nor can any "common interest," between a defendant
and excluded venirmen arise based upon a public humiliation suffered by the
latter, because unlike the exercise of peremptory strikes, Evangeline Parish's
process of selecting foremen does not constitute "overt" action against particular
veniremen.
Id. at 1428.
48. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It
Anyway?, 92 COL L. REV. 725 (1992).
The object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to create equality among [the
various races, but primarily focused on African-Americans and Caucasians], but
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinction
based upon color, or to enforce social as distinguished from political equality of
a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
H.B. BROWN & J.M. HARLAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN HISTORY, A TASTE OF
FREEDOM 1854-1927, 126 (Mortimer J. Adler et al. eds., 1969).
49. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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Americans on the basis of race when the defendant is an African-
American. The Strauder Court found that the United States Constitution
guarantees all citizens the right to a trial by jury.50 Justice Strong, writing
for the majority, reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment provides
every citizen with equal protection of the laws, and, as such, an African-
American defendant should be afforded the same right to a trial by his or
her peers as is any Caucasian defendant.5 The Court concluded that the
West Virginia statute, which discriminated against African-Americans in
the selection of jurors, was a denial of the African-American defendant's
right to equal protection.52
Almost one hundred years later, in Castaneda v. Partida,53 the Court
addressed issues of discrimination against Hispanics in the selection of
grand jurors.54 Specifically, the Court considered whether the state of
Texas had properly designed and implemented its grand jury selection
process so as not to violate the equal protection rights of Hispanic crimi-
nal defendants by excluding Hispanics from the grand jury selection pro-
cess.55 The Supreme Court found that, for a defendant to prevail on an
50. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. In Strauder, the Court considered whether an African-
American defendant could challenge the exclusion of other African-Americans from his grand
jury. Id. Strauder was indicted for murder and convicted. Id. at 304. Strauder objected to
West Virginia law, which prohibited African-Americans from participating as jurors at both the
grand jury level and the petit level, as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The
jury is intended to be a body of the defendant's peers, "that is, . . . of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as which he holds." Id. In a trilogy of
cases decided in 1879 (including Strauder), the Supreme Court analyzed the right of African-
American defendants to raise equal protection violations for the discriminatory selection of
blacks from their grand juries. Peters, 407 U.S. 493, 499 (1972). The Court cited Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) and Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
51. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment contains an
immunity or right for the African-American race; i.e., "the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored .... exemption from legal discriminations, implying
inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race." Id. at 308. (emphasis added). The intentional exclusion by law of African-Americans
from participation in the jury process, solely on the basis of race, creates an unspoken notion of
inferiority among the excluded race. Id.
52. Id. at 309.
53. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Castaneda, a Mexican-American prisoner, filed a writ of habeas
corpus after being indicted and sentenced to eight years in prison for the crime of burglary with
intent to commit rape. Castaneda. 430 U.S. at 485. Partida challenged the discriminatory nature
of the grand jury selection process to which he was subjected in Hidalgo County, Texas. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 483. The "key man" system is a method of jury selection in which community
"leaders" are selected as prospective jurors. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY
SELECTION, THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 6.09 (2d ed. 1990). Texas
used the "key man" system to select prospective jurors from the community as a whole. Casta-
neda, 430 U.S. at 483. The state argued that fifty percent of the names on the list of prospective
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alleged equal protection violation, he or she must prove that the proce-
dures used in the selection of the grand jury members resulted in a "sub-
stantial underrepresentation" of his or her race or designated group.56
The Castaneda Court concluded that, once a defendant proves that there
has been a continuous and systematic exclusion of his or her race or
group in the grand jury selection process, the defendant has established a
prima facie57 case of purposeful discrimination.5" Castaneda was able,
through statistical analysis, to prove that over an eleven-year period, less
than half of the Hispanic population of the county in question was sum-
moned for grand jury service.59 The Court found that the "key-man" jury
selection process as applied in this case, was susceptible to abuse because
it identified Hispanic individuals, thereby, facilitating an easy method by
which those individuals were excluded from the list of qualified county
residents "randomly" selected for jury service.' On the basis of its review
of the relevant testimony regarding the grand jury selection process, the
statistical data, and the method of jury selection, the Court found that
Castaneda established a prima facie case of discrimination in the grand
jury selection process; therefore, the process violated his equal protection
rights.
61
In Peters v. Kiff, the Court expanded its focus on the effects of dis-
criminatory exclusion in the jury selection process by considering
whether a Caucasian criminal defendant has standing under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to
jurors for the defendant's grand jury were of Spanish or Mexican-American descent, as deter-
mined from surnames. Id.
56. Id. at 494.
57. "Prima facie case represents the collection of minimum elements, which, when estab-
lished by a plaintiff in the course of a trial, result in putting the defendant to his [or her] proof."
HowARD HILTON SPELLMAN, How To PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE 4 (Prentice-Hall 3d ed.
1954).
58. Id. In Castaneda, the Court established the following three-prong test for establishing a
prima facie case for an Equal Protection violation: "[flirst, the defendant must be a member of a
suspect class capable of being singled out for different treatment. Second, the degree of the class
substantial in relation to its representation in the community over a significant period of time.
Finally, the selection procedure must be susceptible of abuse." Kurt M. Saunders, Race and
Representation in Jury Selection, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 49, 56 (1997).
59. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495.
60. Id. at 497.
[Tihe Supreme Court has ruled that, in principle, such a method [the key-man
system] can be constitutional, it has recognized the inherent subjectivity of this
approach results in the underrepresentation of an identifiable group. Because of
such challenges, as well as the trend toward making juries more democratic, the
key man system has largely fallen into disuse.
JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 43 (1992).
61. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497.
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challenge the systematic and deliberate exclusion of African-Americans
from grand and petit jury service.62 The Court held that any criminal
defendant, regardless of race, has standing to challenge a discriminatory
jury selection system that is used to compose his or her grand or petit
jury.63 The Court noted that it has a duty to protect the integrity of the
jury selection process and judicial system by upholding a defendant's due
process rights in both cases of actual bias and cases of apparent bias.'
In the 1979 case of Rose v. Mitche/!,65 the Court addressed the issue
of whether an African-American defendant could seek to have his or her
conviction set aside to remedy the purposeful exclusion of African-
Americans from serving as grand jury foreperson.66 The Court concluded
that discrimination in a state grand jury selection process is a basis for the
setting aside of a criminal conviction.67 The Court noted that this solu-
tion is proper when a criminal defendant's right to equal protection of the
62. Peters, 407 U.S. at 494. The Court noted that the jury lists were compiled from county
tax digests, which, according to Georgia law, were separated by race. Id. at 496, n.3. This was
the first opportunity for the Court to examine the challenge of a Caucasian defendant regarding
the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury selection process at both the grand and petit
levels. Id. at 498. Peters, a Caucasian male, alleged that both the grand and petit juries that
had indicted and convicted him had systematically excluded African.Americans during the
selection process. Id. at 496. The Supreme Court reasoned that a jury selection process
(whether at the grand or petit level) that systematically excludes an identifiable segment of the
population violates due process and is "in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the
United States." Id. at 502. The Court held that Peters had standing to challenge the discrimi-
natory selection process used to exclude African-Americans as members from his grand and petit
jury. Id. at 504. When this case was decided, a number of states and lower federal courts fol-
lowed the "same class" rule regarding challenges to discrimination in jury selection, holding that
only a member of the class excluded from jury service had standing to challenge the discrimina-
tory action. Id. at 496-97, n.4. See, Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury
Selection, 74 YALE L.J. 919 (1965) for an explanation of the states following the same class rule.
63. Id. at 505. The Court explained that this notion of standing for any criminal defendant,
regardless of race, was distinctively relevant when the individuals intentionally excluded from
jury service were African-American. Id. This exclusion is a criminal violation under 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1994). Id. This statute prohibits the following:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty
in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen
for such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994).
64. Peters, 407 U.S. at 504.
65. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545. Mitchell and three other African-American defendants
were jointly indicated by a Tennessee grand jury on two counts of first-degree murder in con-
nection with a robbery and later convicted. Id. at 547. The defendants alleged that there had
been discrimination in the selection of the grand jury and its foreperson. Id. at 549.
66. Id. at 550.
67. Id. at 559.
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laws has been violated by such discriminatory behavior.6"
Five years after Rose, in Hobby v. United States,69 the Supreme Court
resolved a conflict among the circuits regarding whether the general dis-
criminatory underrepresentation of African-Americans and women in
the role of federal grand jury foreperson required the reversal of a Cauca-
sian male defendant's conviction." Hobby, the defendant, was indicted
and, before trial, moved to have his indictment dismissed because of the
discriminatory selection of the grand jurors, in general, and the jury fore-
person, in particular, on the basis of "race, color, economic status and
occupation in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution."71 In support of his motion, Hobby provided
statistical data to evidence that, during one seven-year period, there were
no African-American or female grand jury forepersons in any grand jury
proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina.72
The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not entitle a
criminal defendant, such as Hobby, to have a federal grand jury indict-
ment or conviction set aside to remedy the discriminatory selection of the
grand jury foreperson from a properly selected federal grand jury." In
light of the ministerial74 role played by the federal grand jury foreperson,
68. Id. at 556.
69. 468 U.S. 339 (1984). Hobby was indicted for federal fraud charges under the Compre-
hensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 801. Id. at 340. Before his trial,
Hobby moved to have his indictment dismissed on the grounds that the discriminatory selection
of his grand jury violated the Due Process Clause and Fifth Amendment. Id. at 339.
70. Id. at 340. The Court considered the narrow issue of whether any remedy was available
to the defendant, because the Court had already determined that there was an implied assump-
tion that Caucasian criminal defendants have the requisite standing to raise due process objec-
tions to the discriminatory selection of grand jury forepersons. Id. at 342.
71. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 341.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V §§ 1-3.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI § 1.
72. Id. Of fifteen grand juries impaneled between 1974 and 1981, none had an African-
American or female foreperson. Id.
73. Id. at 342.
74. Id. The Court concluded that the discriminatory selection of the federal grand jury fore-
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the Court concluded that any discriminatory action with respect to the
selection of a federal grand jury foreperson would not have a substantial
effect on the due process rights of the defendant."
The Court proceeded to distinguish Hobby 6 from Rose." In Rose, the
Court determined that the selection process and duties assigned to the
state grand jury foreperson were so essential to the overall grand jury pro-
cess that any discriminatory behavior with respect to the foreperson se-
lection would have a substantial effect on the due process rights of the
defendant before the grand jury. 8 Therefore, in Rose, the Court found
that any discrimination in the selection of members of a grand jury would
violate a defendant's due process rights.79 However, the Court held that,
because the defendants failed to make out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination regarding the selection of the grand jury foreperson, there
were no violations of the defendants' due process rights."0 In contrast, the
Court found that Hobby was not entitled to the dismissal of his indict-
ment by a federal grand jury, in light of the ministerial role involved, be-
cause the discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson did
not result in a substantial violation of his rights under the Due Process
clause.81
Finally, in Powers v. Ohio,2 the Court addressed the issue of
person in Hobby was not a serious intrusion on the defendant's fundamental rights because the
federal grand jury foreperson holds only figurehead or clerical responsibilities. Id. at 345. The
Court reasoned that these responsibilities have no real effect on the defendant's right to a fair
trial, because the foreperson has no special duties to set him or her apart or place him or her in a
position of authority over the grand jury as a whole. Id.
75. 468 U.S. at 347. The Court distinguished Hobby from Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979). In Rose, the Court concluded that an iota of discrimination in the selection process of a
Tennessee state grand jury foreperson was grounds for reversal of the defendant's indictment or
conviction. Rose, 443 U.S. at 548. The Court reasoned that, given the numerous and essential
duties assigned to the state grand jury foreperson (assisting the District Attorney with the inves-
tigation, subpoena witnesses and, most important, endorsing any indictment for validity), any
discrimination in the selection of this juror would have a substantial effect on the due process
rights of the defendant. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 347.
76. Id.
77. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
78. Hobby, 468 at 347. The selection process for the state grand jury foreperson required
that twelve jurors be selected by the jury commissioners at random from a list of qualified citi-
zens, while the thirteenth juror, or foreperson, be privately appointed by a judge. Id. In the
federal system, the grand jury foreperson is chosen from among thirteen selected grand jurors.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(c).
79. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 545.
80. Id. at 574. 'The proof of a prima facie case is the keystone in the arch of successful liti-
gation." HOWARD HILTON SPELLMAN, HOW TO PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE 1 (Prentice-Hall
3d ed. 1954).
81. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 350.
82. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Powers objected to the use of peremptory chal-
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whether a Caucasian criminal defendant has the requisite standing to
raise equal protection and due process claims arising from the prosecu-
tion's use of race-based peremptory challenges to strike prospective Af-
rican-American jurors.83 The Court held that a criminal defendant
may raise third-party equal protection claims in the name of individu-
als who were excluded as jurors on the basis of race. 4 The Court noted
that it has previously recognized the right of criminal defendants to
raise the rights of third parties in an effort to challenge their convic-
tions, so long as the moving party satisfies the three required elements
to establish third-party standing.85 The Court determined that the
prosecution's use of the race-based peremptory challenges caused Pow-
ers to suffer an injury, which he, as any other defendant, had a pro-
tected interest in prohibiting.86 This is the right to a "neutral jury se-
lection" procedure and a complete trial free from corruption.87 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that, historically, those persons who are ex-
cluded from the jury pool on the basis of race often fail to assert their
lenges by the prosecution to remove seven African-American venirepersons from his petit jury.
Id. at 400. Powers was convicted of aggravated murder and other offenses by the impaneled jury.
Id. On appeal, Powers alleged that although he was Caucasian, he had the right to object to the
use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from petit jury service. Id.
83. Id. at 400. A peremptory challenge is "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning,
or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (6th
ed. 1990).
Peremptory challenges allow lawyers to withdraw potential jurors during jury
selection without giving a reason. This procedure enables lawyers to select ju-
ries that favor their clients. However, lawyers often base their decisions about
when to use peremptory challenges on biased assumptions about race, gender,
religion, and class. Such authorized bias is a form of institutionalized discrimi-
nation in the legal system that damages the ideals of fairness and justice. Abol-
ishing peremptory challenges would minimize this bias during juror selection; it
would also decrease trial length and expense while increasing public confidence
in the judicial system.
THE JURY SYSTEM 38 (David Bender ed., Greenhaven Press 1997).
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude certain persons
from the jury pool on the basis of race. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 725-26 (1992).
84. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415.
85. Id. Article III of the United States Constitution requires that a litigant have "standing"
to bring a case before the federal courts for adjudication. U.S.CONST. art. III, § 2.
The litigant must have suffered an "injury in fact," thus giving him . . . a "suffi-
ciently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; . . . the liti-
gant must have a close relation to the third party; . . . and there must exist
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
86. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
87. Id.
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rights to prevent and prohibit such actions."
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Campbell has ex-
panded the due process rights of criminal defendants.8 9 The Court's deci-
sion clearly establishes that challenges regarding the unlawful exclusion
of African-Americans from a grand jury may be made by Caucasian and
African-American defendants alike. The Court correctly applied Powers
to establish Campbell's standing to challenge the discriminatory compo-
sition of his grand jury.'
Until Campbell, the Supreme Court had not decided whether a Cau-
casian criminal defendant whose due process rights had been violated by
the state's discriminatory appointment of a grand jury foreperson was
entitled to a remedy.9" The Court's decision has confirmed that the guar-
antees of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause are
properly provided to any defendant whose rights are violated as a result of
the illegal actions of federal or state judicial officials in the process of se-
lecting grand jury forepersons and jurors.
92
It has long been established that African-Americans are guaranteed
the right to be tried by a jury selected not by nondiscriminatory means; it
is only rational that such protections should be extended to Caucasian
defendants. Although a Caucasian criminal defendant may not experi-
ence the same societal repercussions of discrimination as does an Afri-
can-American, the Caucasian defendant may still have an interest in
assisting in the extinguishing of discrimination in the judicial system.
Even when the defendant's underlying reason for bringing a discrimina-
tion claim inures to his or her benefit, the defendant will most likely es-
tablish the Powers93 elements of standing.
The dissent in Campbell is misguided in that it ignores the fact that
Campbell has properly established a prima facie case of third-party
standing. Accordingly, Campbell is entitled to bring forth a claim of racial
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson on behalf of
previously excluded African-Americans, notwithstanding that he will
receive the benefit of having his conviction set aside.94 The task of end-
88. Id. The Court cited Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
89. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). "A fair trial is a basic requirement of due process ....
The due process right to a competent and impartial tribunal is quite separate from the right to
any particular form of proceeding." Id. at 501. "Due process requires a competent and impartial
tribunal in administrative hearings." Id.
90. CampbeU, 118 S. Ct. at 1419.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1425.
93. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
94. Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (1984).
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ing discrimination in the judicial system is no small undertaking; there-
fore, it should be the duty of all persons involved in the judicial system to
ensure that discrimination does not overtake the system. 5
In conclusion, the Campbell Court has properly expanded the pro-
tections originally created to ensure equal protection under the law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court's decision in
Campbell both provides enhanced protection of the due process rights of
criminal defendants and ensures that the jury system will function as in-
tended; that is, a defendant will be tried before a jury composed of his or
her peers. 7
Tracey McCants Lewis
[Tihird party standing law can be grounded in a premise shared by both the
public and private rights paradigms that the protection of individual rights is an
important judicial concern. Many third party standing cases ought to be under-
stood in first party terms: the litigant is simply asserting a violation of his [or
her] own right to be regulated in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule.
Id.
95. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), reprinted in RACE MATTERS at
135 (Cornell West 1994).
I do not imagine that the white and black races will ever live in a country upon
an equal footing. But I believe the difficulty to be still greater in the United
States than elsewhere. An isolated individual may surmount the prejudices of
religion, of his country, or of his race, and if this individual is a king he may ef-
fect surprising changes in society; but a whole people cannot rise, as it were,
above itself. A despot who should subject the Americans and their former slaves
to the same yolk, might perhaps succeed in commingling their races; but as long
as the American democracy remains at the head of affairs, no one will ever un-
dertake so difficult a task; and it may be foreseen that the freer the white popu-
lation of the United States becomes, the more isolated will it remain.
Id.
96. Id. The exclusion of jurors on account of race is a federal crime and any criminal defen-
dant may allege that a judicial officer or another person has violated this rule by excluding any
qualified citizen because of his or her race. See supra note 63.
97. Shawna Burgess, High Court Decision Gets Local Approval, The New Pittsburgh Courier,
April 29, 1998, at Al.
[Campbell v. Louisiana] will help to yield a more representative pool of jurors ...
.[I]t is significant because the Supreme Court addresses the defendant's right to
challenge an indictment. It also shows that a person bringing a challenge of ra-
cial discrimination doesn't have to be a minority .... [TIhere cannot be racial
exclusion no matter the situation. The greater evil is discrimination, . . .exclu-
sion on the basis of race. No one should be excluded from the jury pool.
Interview by Shawna Burgess with Kurt Saunders, Former Allegheny County Jury Commissioner,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (April 28, 1998).

